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1How Do Complainants Experience the Ombuds Procedure?
Detecting cultural patterns of disputing behavior: A comparative analysis of users that 
complain about financial services 
Naomi Creutzfeldt and Ben Bradford∗
Abstract 
Are systems we use for resolving disputes designed in a user-friendly manner? What 
motivates us to accept a decision handed down by an ombuds? There is scant 
empirical evidence to help understand what users of ombuds expect from them and 
what informs these expectations. Yet, in a recent wide-ranging study Creutzfeldt 
(2016) asked people who had just been through an ombuds procedure about precisely 
these issues. Exploring the importance of fairness perceptions for ombuds procedures, 
one of the findings of the project was that decision-acceptance (and trust) was linked 
to users being heard, having a voice, and especially their “first impressions” of the 
ombuds. Does this finding hold true across different jurisdictions, though? By 
focusing on users of the German insurance ombuds (Versicherungsombudsmann) and 
the Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS) in the UK, this chapter will explore how 
procedural justice matters in different ways in different legal cultures. The data reveal 
culturally distinct narratives about expectations towards ombuds, which we suggest is 
partially a result of the different legal socialization experiences of people in Germany 
and the UK. Having identified patterns within the private sector, lessons learned for 
the public sector are discussed. We conclude this chapter with some thoughts as to 
how this study might direct future understandings of user experience and future 
research.
INTRODUCTION 
The ombuds model can be found in most countries around the world. This model has 
developed and adapted from its original roots to cater for, and adapt to, different sets 
of problems.1 Not much is known about people’s expectations of ombuds procedures, 
other than the data on customer satisfaction that the ombuds collect on a regular basis 
for their annual reporting. This data varies in ambition and methodology, which makes 
it impossible to make any meaningful comparisons. By contrast, the data that informs 
this chapter has been collected in a uniform way across ombuds and countries as we 
will explain below.
This chapter is guided by an interest in what people in two countries expect 
from ombuds, and the role that legal cultures play in shaping these expectations. As 
this is a very broad field of study we decided to narrow our focus to a comparison of 
two ombuds that offer redress for problems people encounter with financial services in 
Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). We chose the financial service sector for our 
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2comparative analysis for three reasons. First, financial services is a EU wide regulated 
sector and deals with very similar types of complaints in the studied countries; second, 
there are established ombuds bodies specialized on financial services; third, by 
examining these two similar services we can more confidently attribute differences in 
people’s expectations to legal/cultural differences rather than in the types of problems 
or issues the ombuds deal with. We examine how people, within two different legal 
cultures, common law (the UK) and civil law (Germany), experience the ombuds 
procedure. In the pages that follow we argue that expectations and experiences of 
ombuds’ procedures are influenced by peoples’ perceptions of (and experiences with) 
national legal systems. Building on our work in the UK context2, we show how 
experiences of the informal dispute resolution system are shaped by national legal 
socialization. This, in turn, influences perceptions of procedural fairness.
Building on our data helps us understand ombuds users’ in general and allows 
us to discuss potential implications for public sector ombuds. We argue that the 
insights into the expectations and perceptions of a private ombuds that the empirical 
data brings can be helpful in understanding expectations of public ombuds. Whilst 
there are various institutional and procedural difference between public and private 
ombuds, a shared desire from its users is to perceive a procedure as fair. We return to 
the transferrable lessons in part five.
The data used in this chapter was gathered for the project Trusting the middle-
man: impact and legitimacy of ombuds in Europe.3 Through a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods a large database was collected. For the purpose of 
this chapter we are using data relating to the German insurance ombuds 
(Versicherungsombudsmann) and the British Financial Ombudsman Services (FOS) as 
case studies. 
Six parts form this chapter. First, procedural justice and the ombuds context are 
explored; second, our methodological approach of measuring peoples interactions with 
ombuds; third, the empirical data of user expectations; fourth, different traditions of 
law in Germany and the United Kingdom are discussed in relation to the data; part five 
looks proposes lessons for the public sector; part six concludes the chapter. 
1. FAIR PROCEDURES AND FAIR OUTCOMES IN CONTEXT
Accessing justice in any given system demands assessment of processes as well as 
outcome. Research on the concept of procedural justice – people’s judgements about 
the fairness of legal and other processes in which they are involved – first developed 
within social psychology4 before being taken up by criminologists and others 
concerned with the way people relate to structures of power and authority.5 The core 
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3idea is simple: when people are interacting with those who have power, authority or 
influence over them they are closely attuned to the fairness of the processes concerned. 
‘Process’ here does not necessarily mean ‘procedure’ or ‘protocol’ in a legal sense, but 
relates more to the quality of human interaction with power holders such as police 
officers, judges, tax officials or employers. A widely replicated set of empirical 
findings suggest that during such encounters people tend to value being treated with 
dignity and respect, having voice (that they are allowed to put their side of the 
argument), a sense that decisions are being made in a fair, unbiased and neutral 
fashion, and the development of trust between the parties concerned.6 Experiencing 
procedural justice promotes an overall sense of fairness, and, indeed, research over a 
wide range of criminological contexts has shown that people are often more concerned 
with the quality of the procedure than the nature of the outcome, and that compared 
with distributive fairness and outcome favourability, process fairness is a more 
important predictor of outcomes such as satisfaction with the procedure, decision 
acceptance, trust in the authority and legitimacy.7 
Despite the strength of some of the research on procedural justice, such 
research is not yet conclusive. The portability of procedural justice theory to non-
Western contexts has been questioned,8 although some studies have shown that even 
in the most challenging contexts procedural justice effects can be identified.9 More 
importantly for current purposes in novel legal situations, or where notions of civil law 
rather than the criminal law are more relevant, the evidence for the trust, legitimacy or 
user satisfaction enhancing benefits of procedural justice is scarce.10 Therefore we are 
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4proposing to address this omission and extend the inquiry of the relevance of 
procedural justice in the ombuds context.11 More precisely, we are exploring the 
explanatory strength of theories of legal socialization and legal culture for procedural 
justice effects. Such theories seek to describe and explain ‘relatively stable patterns of 
legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes’,12 as well as patterns of resistance to 
the law. 
A legal system is made up of an operating set of legal institutions, procedures 
and rules. It is a broad term that defines the laws we have, the processes for making 
those laws, and the processes for making sure the laws are followed. The system 
within which we are embedded both reflects and shapes how we behave and how we 
expect people, organizations and governments to behave towards each other, and 
toward us. Within this system, legal culture is expressed and reproduced though 
institutions, authorities, and people that comprise and use it. In this chapter, we are 
interested in the influence of legal culture on peoples’ approach to dispute resolution 
and what this means for their experience with the ombuds model.
We are directed by a wide-ranging definition and understanding of legal 
culture. Guided by Nelken13 and Michaels14, we understand legal culture as something 
that is at the intersection between law and culture without clear boundaries. ‘Legal 
culture represents that cultural background of law which creates the law and which is 
necessary to give meaning to law’.15 Legal culture therefore must include the legal 
system, its institutions, procedures, and rules. Our legal culture forms how we relate to 
the actors in the legal system, authority, and institutions.
Adopting this theoretical approach, we predict in our ombuds context that 
cultural differences will mean that people in Germany, with a civil law heritage, will 
approach the ombuds with expectations that emphasize the outcome, as well as a focus 
on the extent to which it is delivered by an authoritative and respected representative 
of the law (e.g. judge, lawyer). In the UK, on the other hand, socialization in an 
adversarial, common law context (where, not least, the quality of the outcome is 
considered dependent on the process through which it was arrived at) will mean that 
the fairness of the process is likely to be relatively more important. 
This hypothesis that procedural justice is valued highly in the UK is not to say 
that the outcome will, therefore, be unimportant in the UK. Indeed, we have already 
reported that among users of UK ombuds services ‘outcome favourability’ and 
procedural justice are key factors shaping decision acceptance, and indeed our 
research showed that outcome favourability has a more important weighting in the 
ombuds context than is often the case in other studies, for example of policing.16 One 
possible explanation for the relatively greater importance of outcome favourability in 
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5this context might be found in consideration of the place of the ombuds in people’s 
value systems. We suggest that people are unsure about what an ombuds, a relatively 
novel legal actor, can do for them, and are uncertain about the way the process works. 
They will therefore find it harder to form expectations and judgements about this 
process, and will revert to outcome favourability as the primary factor in overall 
judgement formation. We might also note that in this context it will usually be clear 
what a favourable outcome is (e.g. money refunded, faulty goods replaced), in contrast 
to many interactions people have with, for example, the police (when for example they 
may have contacted officers about a victimization they did not really expect them to 
solve but about which they wanted ‘something done’).
The above analysis seems likely, prima facie, to be true in both Germany and 
the UK. But more widely, since people’s knowledge of the norms and values 
pertaining to the informal system are likely to be poorly developed – if they have any 
knowledge of it at all – it is also likely they will draw upon their existing legal values, 
developed in relation to the formal system and with authorities within it, when 
thinking about the ombuds. Culturally specific narratives and values will also 
influence, therefore, the way in which an individual relates to and interacts with an 
ombuds. For example, the legalistic and hierarchical understanding of, and approach 
to, the law in Germany (and hence the informal justice system), is one reason to 
suspect that ombuds users in Germany are unlikely to place great value on procedural 
justice. This is because culturally citizens in Germany do not expect to be involved in 
the process as active agents but see themselves rather as passive recipients of 
judgements arrived at via the application of specialist knowledge (usually managed 
through a lawyer).17 The adversarial system in the UK, however, positions people as 
more active participants in legal processes – a claim tempered of course by a 
realization that the criminal process remains a ‘dispute between two parties stolen by 
the State’.18 They therefore have more of a stake in the procedures used, making 
people in the UK relatively more focussed on process fairness. 
MEASURING PEOPLES INTERACTIONS WITH OMBUDS
The dataset
To test the hypothesis that different legal cultures in Germany and the UK may 
explain the different responses to ombuds, we analysed a part of the empirical dataset 
that was collected for a project on impact and legitimacy of ombuds in Europe.19 The 
main tool for data collection was a consumer satisfaction survey. The surveys were 
sent out by post and email by the ombuds between September 2014 – March 2015. 
The distribution of letters and emails was chosen to represent ombuds users’ habits 
for the individual schemes studied in this project. The survey was sent out to people 
who had recently been through a complaints procedure with an ombuds. The study 
included fourteen ADR providers in total, from the UK, Germany and France. The 
dataset for this chapter, as mentioned above, are the Financial Ombudsman Services 
17
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6(FOS) in the UK with a sample size of n=195 (response rate 15 / 57 per cent)20 and 
the German insurance ombuds (VO) with a sample size of n=514 (response rate 35 
per cent). The sample was weighted (to balance out the differences in sample-size) 
and is representative.
Both ombuds deal with very similar types of problems that consumers of 
financial services may encounter. In 2001 the FOS was set up by law as an 
independent public body. Its job is to resolve individual disputes between consumers 
and businesses – ‘fairly, reasonably, quickly and informally’. The FOS states that: 
‘Fairness isn’t only about making sure our answers and decisions are technically right. 
It’s also about wanting to make what we do feel right. And we do this by listening, 
thinking and explaining.’21 If the FOS decide someone’s been treated unfairly, they 
have legal powers to put things right. In 2015/2016 the FOS received 219,996 new 
complaints about insurance – including payment protection insurance (PPI). This was 
slightly lower than the previous year and represented 65per cent of new complaints 
received as a whole. Looking across insurance generally, the primary issue resulting in 
complaints remains the quality of communication between insurers and their 
customers. This applies whether a complaint is about how an insurer sold a policy, 
how they administered it, or how they dealt with a claim.
The VO22 is an independent and accredited ADR provider that is free of charge 
for the consumer, set up in 2001. The VO helps consumers navigate and understand 
the disputes resulting out of complex insurance contracts. German insurance 
companies agreed to form the ombuds for two reasons; first, to protect consumers and 
second, to prevent disputes with their customers from being brought to a court. In 
2015 the VO received 20,827 complaints, of which 18,942 were about businesses; 336 
about intermediaries; and 1,548 other.23 
Detecting cultural narratives 
Respondents were generous in sharing their experiences, which means that we had a 
dataset of 709 opinions. The open-ended questions posed in the satisfaction survey 
were: what did you expect the ombuds to do for you and how satisfied were you with 
the ombuds process. The survey additionally provided, as well as options after some of 
the closed tick-box questions to allow respondents to elaborate upon their experiences. 
These options provided a rich set of narratives. The qualitative narratives support and 
expand upon the overarching argument of this chapter, that peoples’ expectations of 
the informal system of dispute resolution provided by ombuds are influenced by the 
national legal culture. In previous work the culturally distinct expectations of ombuds 
have been identified, starting with individuals’ attitudes towards an ombuds, and then 
exploring narratives of similarities and differences.24 Building upon this work, the 
20 The FOS ran two large online customer satisfaction surveys as part of their own regular consumer 
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7same methodological approach has been applied to this dataset. The next part will 
present and discuss our data.
EXPECTATIONS AS A JUSTICE-SEEKER 
The following offers some examples of variation in the way German and UK residents 
thought about their use of ombuds services and how they experienced the processes 
concerned. We present two sets of analyses. First, we consider what motivated people 
to complain to the ombuds service, whether this was achieving a resolution to their 
problem (justice via restitution); obtaining an apology and/or a sense of voice (justice 
via fair process); or attempting to change the behaviour of the service provider 
concerned (justice via organizational change). Second, we consider the correlation 
between respondents stated willingness to accept the decision of the ombuds in their 
case with perceived outcome favourability, on the one hand, and the perceived fairness 
of the process, on the other. Throughout we contrast the views of the German and UK 
residents, and hypothesize that German respondents will be more concerned with 
outcomes than UK respondents, and less concerned with procedural justice. 
Motivations for the complaint 
Table 1 shows that the German respondents were indeed somewhat more outcome 
focussed compared to British respondents.  They were consistently more likely to rate 
‘resolving my problem’ (85 per cent), ‘getting my money back’ (65 per cent) and 
‘getting what was lawfully mine’ (61 per cent) as a most important concern.25 Note 
that a small but meaningful proportion of British respondents rated these concerns as 
the least important factors behind their complaint.
----- Table 1 about here -----
By contrast, Table 2 shows that compared to the German sample, the British sample 
tended to be more focussed on procedural justice concerns. Most notably, over half 
(52 per cent) of British respondents indicated that being treated with dignity and 
respect was most important in informing their decision to complain, compared with 
just over a quarter (28 per cent) of German respondents. An exception to this pattern 
was that getting an impartial view was equally important to both German and UK 
respondents, with over two-thirds in each case indicating this was a most important 
concern.
----- Table 2 about here -----
Finally, Table 3 reveals that the British respondents were also much more concerned 
with changing the system and protecting others from having the same problem as them 
(56 per cent). This finding is a little more difficult to explain, but it may relate (a) to a 
more widespread understanding in the UK that service providers can be forced to 
change their practices as a result of informal legal procedures and/or (b) a stronger 
25
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8sense in the UK that informal legal procedures can be of collective as well as personal 
benefit.
----- Table 3 about here -----
Willingness to accept the ombuds’ decision 
Turning to aspects of the experience that might be associated with people’s 
willingness to accept the decisions of ombuds, Table 4 first shows that, in both the 
German and UK samples, when respondents thought the decision had gone in their 
favour decision acceptance was almost total. However German respondents were over 
twice as likely as their British counterparts to accept unfavourable outcomes (42 per 
cent). One explanation here might be that people socialized in a civil law system (i.e. 
the German respondents) are more inclined to accept the outcomes of procedures that 
go against them when they perceive those procedures as properly constituted in a 
formal sense – and perhaps also because the decisions of authorities are seen as non-
contestable. People socialized in a common law system, by contrast, may be more 
questioning and more willing to assert their rights or interests in the face of 
institutional decision-making – making decisions more open to contest. 
----- Table 4 about here -----
By contrast there was little variation by country in the association between decision 
acceptance and perceptions of the fairness of the process (Table 5). In both Germany 
and the UK people who thought procedures are fair were very likely to accept the 
outcome, while those who thought procedures were unfair were very unlikely to accept 
the outcome; those who were uncertain about the fairness of the produce were 
relatively evenly split. 
Intriguingly, levels of uncertainty about process fairness were significantly 
higher in the German sample (24 per cent of German respondents reported being 
uncertain about the overall fairness of the process, compared with 13 per cent of 
British respondents), while people in the UK sample were significantly more likely to 
have judged the process unfair (26 per cent did so, compared with 11 per cent of 
German respondents). One interpretation of these figures is that people in Germany 
were in general more uncertain about the process, and, perhaps, on what basis to judge 
unfairness in this novel ombuds context.
----- Table 5 about here -----
The data presented in the tables above suggest clear differences in expectations 
between respondents in the two countries. British respondents put more emphasis on 
procedural justice and helping sort out the problem to prevent future grievances, 
whereas German respondents appeared more outcome focussed – they were even more 
concerned than their British counterparts with getting back what they felt was owed to 
them. Perhaps slightly counter-intuitively, though, Germans appeared more ready to 
9accept decisions that went against them; even though they entered into the ombuds 
process very concerned with outcomes, when these were not favourable, people in 
Germany were more acquiescent to the decision reached.
These findings indicate a clearly different public stance toward the ombuds 
service in the UK compared with Germany. In the former context people appear more 
relational or interactional, entering into the process more concerned with procedural 
justice and reforming the service provider, and less willing to accept decisions that go 
against them. People in Germany appear to be more rule and outcome obedient – they 
are more focussed with what the ombuds can give them in terms of restitution, and 
they are more ready to accept the decision, whatever it is. These findings are supported 
through the narratives the data provided (see below).
Other large-scale surveys evaluating national legal cultures have found national 
differences in values and attitudes towards the law. Here it must be remembered that 
the methodology used and the measures tested to answer the research objective are 
different. The general findings, however, are similar. Gibson and Caleidra26 found that 
significant differences between EU member states in the legal values held by citizens. 
This is of course a very general claim, and it obviously elides differences within 
countries; although Germans are different from the British in average, not all 
Germans, or all British, are similar. Yet interest in how legal culture shapes (or does 
not) legal and political systems and the actions of individuals remains strong.27 The 
concept of legal culture forms part of an explanation for why people in different 
contexts have different patterns of behaviours and attitudes towards authority. 
Examples of cultural narratives 
Building upon the themes identified in the quantitative analysis above, culturally 
distinct narratives support the findings.  
German narratives28 
The VO dataset provided a range of responses that responded to the question of 
expectations with very legalistic language. The set-up of the VO might influence this: 
the Ombud, Prof Hirsch (there is only one, unlike in the UK FOS where there are 
many ombuds), is a retired judge, and all the employees working on complaints are 
fully trained lawyers. This means that the whole process takes place within a formal 
setting, and utilises equally formal language. Another interesting distinction to the UK 
is that the German respondents direct their expectations towards the Ombud (Prof 
Hirsch), they address clear expectations of ‘him’, rather than of the procedure or of his 
staff in general.  This in itself is an expression of the legal culture, as it is unlikely a 
private sector system in the UK would ever be set up in this way.
This is closely linked to the focus of the respondents on outcomes: 
“I expected the ombuds to clarify the damage (financially) to my benefit”
“I want him to enforce my contractual rights”
26
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“I want him to get more money for me, similar to the recent spectacular 
judgement in the XXX case or the banking judgment in the BGH 
[Bundesgerichtshof].”
We also find narratives that suggest why German respondents were more likely to 
accept the decision even if it is not in their favour. Respondents talked about the need 
to obey the authoritative set up of the ombuds institution, and about their trust in a 
lawyer or judge to provide fair outcomes. 
“Clarifying the legal position and helping me enforce my rights”
“The realization that a normal citizen cannot understand the insurance contracts 
and details, even if it's repeated often.”
UK narratives 
The FOS dataset revealed narratives reiterated the importance for the UK respondents 
of the procedures involved, and of the potential for change to improve the lot of others 
in the same position as themselves.
Examples of procedural justice related narratives:
“I expect the ombuds ‘to keep you informed all the way through and to give 
clear reasons for their decisions”
“I did expect co-operation, maybe some communication to clarify issues, and 
then common sense supported.”
“I felt the mortgage company would not listen to me or offer me an explanation 
of why they made this mistake. I felt that once the ombuds was involved then the 
company would have to explain why and when they had made the mistake”
Some narratives supporting the change claim included:
“ [The] Financial Ombudsman is the common man's last resort. They should be 
decisive and timely while acting on a case. In some instances they can refer a 
case to a small claim court where the culprit like the Bank is failing to live up to 
her error. People should not be broken while all efforts are made protecting 
culpable institutions. In the very least those people at the helm of affairs when 
things went wrong should be made to pay - forgo their earnings or at least be 
made to face consequences of the actions. How can they be eating fat salaries 
while individuals are trodden upon and desperately toiling to make a living - the 
little they saved being used to feed some Bank chiefs and thieves [...] It's 
wrong!!!”
“I expected the Ombudsman to look at my case independently to fully 
understand the full extent of my claim. Because what I understood is the main 
purpose of the XXX's claims investigator is to figure out how to manipulate a 
claim towards his purpose. Now I am not a solicitor if I was I would not have 
ask you to look at my case I am honestly sure the XXX has got it all wrong and 
11
no one can convince me otherwise, but I am powerless. I also don't want this to 
happen to other people like me.”
2. A CULTURAL APPROACH TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Taking our cue from theorising on legal cultures, in this chapter we have sought to 
explore a cultural approach to dispute resolution, through empirical research. 
Bringing together the quantitative data with the narratives obtained in our study helps 
understand the cultural divide between the users of financial ombuds in Germany and 
the UK. Our relationship with authority is mediated through the legal culture in which 
we live, amongst other things. This influences our expectations of institutions and 
their procedures for delivering dispute resolution. It also has an effect on what 
motivates us to bring a complaint to an ombuds, and on what we anticipate from the 
process. 
We tested three examples in this context, exploring whether people who 
approached an ombuds were motivated by (a) achieving a resolution to their problem 
(justice via restitution); (b) obtaining an apology and/or a sense of voice (justice via 
fair process); or (c) attempting to change the behaviour of the service provider 
concerned (justice via organizational change).
The German data suggests a deeply rooted instinct towards procedures 
developed within a civil law system: a hierarchical view of (state) authority. This 
notion translates into the acceptance of decisions that are handed down by properly 
appointed authorities, and a focus on the outcome. In the UK the common law 
tradition, on the other hand, with its populist democratic understanding of the state and 
its authorities, encourages people to put a greater emphasis on process and procedure, 
and the desire to make systems and processes better for the wider public.
Of course, we are not suggesting that legal cultures are the sole drivers of 
peoples’ encounters with, and expectations of, authorities. There are many other 
influences on our attitudes and interactions with authorities. Our claim is merely that 
the underlying legal culture has an influence on what people expect from a process of 
informal dispute resolution. Based on our findings above, we offer a culturally–
focussed lens for viewing how people interact with ombuds in different countries, 
which presents civil and common law as two distinct cultural approaches in the 
development of national law.
Civil law and common law 
Although the basic purpose of the rule of law is a consistent feature of social orders, 
the design detail varies. Broadly speaking there are two different heritages of legal 
systems in Europe29, the common law and the civil law traditions.30 The common law 
tradition developed in the Middle Ages in England and was transplanted into the 
British colonies. The civil law tradition developed across Europe and into the colonies 
29
 Peter Stein, ‘Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law’ [1992] Tulane Law Review, Vol. 66 1591-
1604; 
Jerome Frank, ‘Civil Law Influences on the Common Law - Some Reflections on “Comparative” and 
“Contrastive” Law’ [1956] University of Pennsylvania Law Review 887
30
 Mathias Siems, ‘Common Law and Civil Law’ in his Comparative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004 41- 70); Thomas Glyn Watkin, An Historical Introduction to Modern Civil Law 
(Ashgate 1990) 
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of the European imperial powers’. There are many differences and similarities 
between the two traditions, however for current purposes the most noticeable 
divergence can be found in the way that the two legal cultures have developed their 
approaches to understanding the law and dispute resolution. A central, productive, 
feature of this difference is the fact that civil law is codified and usually relies on a 
written constitution; whereas common law, on the other hand, is un-codified. This 
means that it is largely based on judicial decisions on similar cases (precedent). These 
precedents are collated in collections of case law. 
These differences are visible in the framework of the legal system and have an 
influence on how we, as users, relate to a legal system and its institutions. 
Papadopoulos31 argues that one cannot assume that the content of the law is separate 
from the basic cultural parameters. This makes cultural differences an important, if not 
essential, consideration in relation to understanding different approaches to law and 
dispute resolution. Generally speaking, common law is a tradition that focuses on 
processes that are made up of adversarial battles between lawyers. The civil law 
tradition, on the other hand, is more focussed on political discourse, the public interest, 
and the state. The written law has supremacy in the civil law tradition whereas the 
common law tradition, the law can ideally be found in the regularity of social 
practices.32 Focussing on the relationship we have towards authority and applying this 
line of reasoning to our studied context, common law can be seen as premised on a 
populist democratic view of state authority. In contrast, following Damaska’s claim, 
civil law procedure is based on a hierarchical bureaucratised view of state authority. 
The absence of a written constitution has determined how political and legal 
institutions have evolved in the UK. Without a tradition of revolutions or major 
upheavals the notion of the state had no need to be distinct from the nation.33 The 
UK’s common law system has been produced (by the state), therefore, by adapting to 
situations, exploring and leaning from mistakes. Policing, for example, has developed 
in a local, decentralized and unarmed form, and is framed by an ideology that sees 
police as part of the people rather than part of the government.34 This notion of 
accessible authority forms part of British commitment to the principles of equal 
justice for all is its publicly funded legal aid system, an offspring of the nation’s 
Welfare State (although this system has become highly attenuated in recent years).35 
The post WWII German Grundgesetz united social justice and democratic 
values that oblige the state to go beyond providing a legal framework. ‘It obliges the 
German state to set societal values of what is right, what is wrong and what is just. 
[…] The continued proliferation of complex German laws in all areas of human 
interaction has led to the expansion of the German social justice state and the 
expectation amongst disputants that the paternalistically interventionist State will set 
31 Ioannis Papadopoulos, ‘Introduction to comparative legal cultures: the civil law and the common law 
on evidence and judgment’ (oral presentation of the book by Antoine Garapon & Ioannis 
Papadopoulos, Juger en Amerique et en France : Culture judiciaire française et common law [2004] 
Cornell law faculty working papers 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=clsops_papers 
32
 Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal 
Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, New Haven & London 2009)
33
 Kenneth Dyson, ‘The State Tradition in Western Europe’ (Colchester: ECPR Press 2010) puts it 
Britain is ‘stateless in lacking the idea of the state…’
34
 R. Reiner, The politics of the police (4 ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010).
35
 Nicholas Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State (Harper Collins 1995)
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and enforce norms’.36 This development goes hand in hand with an effective and 
efficient court system and highly regulated legal profession. 
What does all this mean for the way people in this two countries approach 
dispute resolution? Recall our claim that socialization within either of the two legal 
systems will influence what people expect from the informal system (ombuds, for 
example).37 In Germany citizens are used to authority based on notions of order, 
hierarchy and bureaucracy. The ombuds in Germany follow this institutional structure, 
which increases public acceptance and provides users with a familiar sense of trust as 
people align their expectations with the formal character of the (informal) ombuds 
body. The data reflects those patterns: German respondents were much more willing to 
accept an outcome if it was not in their favour (table 4) because they believed it had 
been handed down by a properly constituted authority. In the UK, by contrast, people 
are more inclined to consider authority as something that is earned through action 
rather than granted by status, making them more attentive to processes of interaction. 
The procedures have to be experienced as fair for the outcome to be accepted. 
We are arguing, therefore, that legal culture plays a role in explaining our 
expectations, understanding and acceptance of an ombuds and our attitude towards 
dispute resolution. Sceptics of this broad approach might suggest competing 
explanations for the identified differences. For example, rather than focusing on the 
general concept of legal culture, we could look at more specific, local determinants as 
alternative explanatory factors. This shifts the debate to an institutional level. To 
explore this in detail is beyond the scope of this chapter but we offer a few thoughts 
nevertheless. Focussing in the following on two differences, we look at the ombuds 
styles and the national availability of ombuds (or ADR providers).
We set out in this chapter to understand what people expect from a financial 
ombuds process in two different countries. We chose the financial sector because it is 
a regulated sector and the two countries have had an ombuds for the same amount of 
time. These ombuds deal with similar cases in the respective countries and therefore 
provide a fertile ground for comparison. Both ombuds, although available and 
regulated (consumer ADR directive) in European justice systems, are also in their 
infancy, and still ‘finding their place’ in the national justice system. European 
legislation leaves it up to national legislators to decide upon the details of the 
institutional implementation. This produced a variation of styles and institutional 
arrangements of the ombuds.38 This development, we posit, has happened in close 
connection to the national legal culture.
This leads to the second point, the space ombuds occupy within the justice 
system. They do not exist in a vacuum; they are part of a national dispute resolution 
system. Looking at the private sector ombuds we can say with confidence that they 
have become part of the national justice system without most people noticing. The 
lack of awareness of ADR bodies in general poses a significant obstacle to accessing 
them. For those people who do find and make use of ombuds, it is a novel experience, 
which means users expectations of the specific process involved are not well formed. 
36
 Nadja Alexander, ‘What’s Law Got to Do with It – Mapping Modern Mediation Movements in Civil 
and Common Law Jourisdicitons’ [2001] Bond L Rev 13: i
37
 Elsewhere will be explored the notion that this is happening because the informal system has not 
experienced a ‘socialization process’ of its own, and that people’s experiences of it are therefore 
mainly informed through their expectations of, and experiences with, the formal legal system 
(Creutzfeldt 2018). 
38
 Christopher Hodges, Iris Benoehr and Naomi Creutzfeldt ‘Consumer ADR in Europe’ (Hart 
Publishing 2012)
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This seems, in turn, to lead to people engaging with the ombuds with high and mostly 
unrealistic expectations.39 These expectations are generated in a variety of ways. One 
channel is prior interaction with the legal system (if positive or negative); another is 
the route that people have to take before engaging with an ombuds (broadly speaking, 
unsuccessful attempts to sort out the problem with the provider that caused it), for 
example. Expectations are further fuelled by emotions built during the individual 
complaint journey. An ombuds, therefore, has to handle these incoming waves of 
expectations and manage them accordingly. This is an institutional challenge; usually 
the least well-trained staff – those who handle phone lines and respond to emails – 
have to deal with these initial contacts, meaning there is a relatively high risk that first 
impressions will be poor. Here it might be advisable to provide front line staff with 
better training to be able to manage consumers’ expectations from the outset, 
providing the consumers with a sense of acceptance and control over the process. 
Unlike the private system, public sector ombuds have been around for some 
time.40 How, if at all, does a pre-existing exposure to a public sector ombuds shape the 
expectations and interactions with a private sector ombuds? We suspect that people 
who have been involved in a public sector complaint or have heard about them in the 
media, will have formed specific opinions about the public ombuds. These are then 
likely to be added into the mix of expectations from the private sector ombuds.
Various elements of the ombuds process may be puzzling or difficult for users. 
It is not straightforward to grasp the notion that a private ombuds can make final 
decisions – but does not necessarily follow up to see if the company has actually acted 
upon the decision. Consumers can take the case to a court if they feel it has not been 
resolved fairly, while a public sector ombuds decision can be challenged through 
judicial review (which needs expert legal help). All of these options include more 
time, effort, and energy spent for the individual. Our data show that in both countries 
experiencing a fair process is a key element for an individual going through an 
ombuds process. Although the outcome matters, the route to this outcome is equally 
important. How then, can user-experience be maximized to enable them to accept the 
outcome and feeling that they had a good experience? Further, how much can we learn 
and translate from the more recent private sector into the public sector? 
3. LESSONS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Preparing the legislation and subsequent implementation of the ADR directive was 
achieved in record time. Driven by a political demand for increased access to justice 
and improved access to the common market, a debate emerged as to how best achieve 
those aims through the national ADR landscape. To date, however, the Directive has 
failed to deliver the hoped for impact. This is likely to take time. A more immediate 
outcome however, is that a debate about quality and provision of services has 
emerged. This very debate allows us to critically examine the efficiency of the public 
ombuds and consider lessons to be learned. Riding on the wave of existing political 
interest, and other longer-term developments, the UK has revisited its public service 
ombuds and significant changes are underway in form of a public services 
ombudsman bill.41 
39
 Naomi Creutzfeldt, ‘What Do We Expect of Ombudsmen? Narratives of Everyday Engagements 
with the Informal Justice System’ [2016] International Journal of Law in Context 12 (4)
40
 Carl 2016 
41
 Cabinet Office, ‘Draft Public Service Ombdusman Bill’ [2016]
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The intersection of private and public led to important questions about the 
purpose of ombuds being revisited in general. Alongside this, a shift in the purpose of 
the public service ombuds has been identified. As O’Brien42 suggests, the consumer 
ADR directive ‘might constructively encourage the reinforcement of consumer rights 
[…]  any such tendency towards consumerism in the development of the ombudsman 
institution should be balanced by respect for the distinctive qualities of public-sector 
ombudsmen as agents of a form of participatory democracy (p. 1).’ O’Brien further 
argues that a shift has taken place in which the ombuds is no longer ‘focussing on the 
imbalance of power or the restoration of values such as liberty and equality but the 
consumerist notion of ‘quality of services’.43 Is the public sector ombuds experiencing 
a consumerist turn?44 
Interpreting the consumerist turn as petitioning for an improvement of the 
quality of services then we can look to our data from the private sector and suggest the 
following. We found that people who perceive the process by which an ombuds 
reaches a decision to be fair, they will be more acceptant of the outcome. The quality 
of the service can be improved by responding to those identified consumer- citizen 
needs. We think that monitoring the customer experience is a crucial lens into a 
smooth and effective functioning of an ombuds process in general.  If conducted 
properly, monitoring consumer satisfaction can also expose culturally distinct patterns 
that can be provided for. This can then benefit the ombuds to improve their processes 
and make them more customer-friendly. 
Private and public sector ombuds deal with different types of problems that 
affect peoples’ lives in different ways. This means that the processes offered, the 
outcomes, and the time they take differ too. We fully appreciate the complexity these 
differences raise, however we propose a shift in the way a procedure is experienced for 
the users of a system. In other words, whilst there are many differences in institutional 
purpose and structure, also across countries, what our research uncovered is that it is 
important for all of us to perceive a procedure as fair. This might mean different things 
in different contexts – which allows for sector or culture specific alterations. 
For example, some practical measures that can be directly transferred from the 
findings in the private sector are the following. A public sector ombuds might shift 
some of the case handlers and more senior staff to assist in the early stages of a 
complaint. This would have the following benefits. First, the user would feel that 
someone from the ombuds team who can take decisions is dealing with their case and 
thus manage expectations and build trust early on in the process. Second, the 
complainant is more likely be willing for the process to take more time to resolve, as 
long as they are kept in the loop of progress of their case. These might seem very 
small alterations to procedures, but as our research suggests, they can have an 
immense impact on fairness perceptions and outcome acceptance.
Of course, realistically there are always budgetary constraints, internal 
institutional limits, and political considerations that will influence the scope of 
development and improvement of the ombuds procedures. The public sector ombuds, 
unlike its private counterpart, comes with a long institutional history and is rootedness 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-public-service-ombudsman-bill, accessed 28 
August 2017
42
 Nick O’Brien, ‘The Ombudsman as Democratic “alternative”: Reading the EU Consumer ADR 
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in different national contexts. We argue that any change is likely to take more time not 
only to implement but also to reach users awareness. Change in procedures go hand in 
hand with staff training, institutional cultural change, and raising awareness of the 
change. However, harnessing the consumerist turn as a driver for change, learning 
from the procedural justice effects, we suggest it is a worthwhile endeavour to 
restructure and improve procedures to make them more accessible and perceived as 
fair by its users. 
Further, picking up on some of the responses to the consultation on a single 
public service ombuds for the UK45, themes emerged that could be implemented by 
means of the above suggestions. For example, improving the ‘fragmented nature of 
ombudsmen services [that] can cause frustration and confusion’ (p. 8). Providing 
clearer timescales and procedural standards with inbuilt accountability measures along 
the way (progress reports, regular updates) would hugely contribute to transparency in 
decision-making and to users experience. Improving complaints-handing overall 
would assist building a system of accountability, trust, and to help users manage their 
expectations. The consultation suggested to improve complaints handling through the 
‘creation of a of a “complaints culture” in which the learning from complaints is 
disseminated widely and built upon while allowing those delivering public services to 
remain in control of, and accountable for, the design of their own complaints systems 
(p. 16). The idea of a system to constantly check on itself and use the data it is 
producing to improve is a good one, in theory. The challenge remains to ensure that 
the highest procedural quality standards are sustained and don't get sacrificed on the 
way to efficiency.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we developed our argument that experiences and expectations of 
ombuds procedures are formed by peoples’ understandings of (and experiences with) 
national legal systems. This, in turn, has an effect on perceptions of procedural justice. 
We discussed how people, in two different legal traditions, common law (the UK) and 
civil law (Germany), experience the ombuds procedure. We found distinct cultural 
approaches to ombuds procedures in the data, which suggest that national legal culture 
has a strong influence on the way in which people engage with ombuds. We are not 
making the claim that the national legal culture is the only influence, however. There 
are a multitude of alternative explanations. 
The implications of our work will vary depending on the context. In this 
chapter, we discussed some of the implications our findings can have on the public 
sector ombuds in the UK. The proliferation of private sector ombuds has raised many 
questions as to the purpose of an ombuds in general. At the intersection between 
private and public sector, at this point in time where the landscape in the UK is 
undergoing a significant shift, we propose some lessons to be obtained. First, with an 
emphasis on consumer rights and human rights, process and outcomes an ombuds can 
deliver might be restructured. A more accessible procedure with clear and 
understandable messages of what an ombuds can and cannot do, and equally clear 
messages about the remit and objectives would be advisable. Second, harnessing the 
discussion on quality of service, the public ombuds could adjust and update 
procedures to incorporate our procedural justice findings, as suggested above. This 
45 fn 40.
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would enhance user experience, satisfaction, and build trust in the institution. Change 
does not happen overnight. Although the distinction between public and private 
remains an important one, understanding procedures from the perspective of the user 
offers practical lessons that can be applied to procedures of both public and a private 
ombuds. Some of which we discussed in section three.
We suggest that future research could explore further the intersection between 
different culturally driven values and expectations of dispute resolution processes. 
Recognizing these values and how they impact upon the expectations of complaints 
procedures will help identify those parts in existing approaches that need an update. 
Here one might also use the collected empirical data to inform a better design of the 
procedures for both public and private ombuds. Being sensitive to users needs might 
mean some short-term additional investment into staffing and training. In the longer 
term, it is likely to improve user experience and overall perceptions of the service. Of 
course, we are not suggesting that these changes can happen in isolation of the 
individual institutional circumstance. We do believe, however, that paying attention to 
users needs (within their cultural context), alongside other procedural improvements, 
will assist in providing a service that is generally more trustworthy and transparent. 
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